Washington Law Review
Volume 50
Number 3 Symposium: Law and Education
6-1-1975

Constitutional Law—Establishment Clause: No Tuition Grants, No
Tax Benefits for Parents of Nonpublic School
Children—Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
E. Michele Moquin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Education Law Commons

Recommended Citation
E. M. Moquin, Recent Developments, Constitutional Law—Establishment Clause: No Tuition Grants, No
Tax Benefits for Parents of Nonpublic School Children—Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), 50 Wash. L. Rev. 653 (1975).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol50/iss3/7

This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-v ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: No TUITION
GRANTS, No TAX BENEFITS FOR PARENTS OF NONPUBLIC SCHOOL CHIL-

DEN-Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Section 1 of amendments to New York's education and tax laws
provided for direct money grants from the state to qualifying nonpublic schools to be used for the maintenance and repair of school facilities and equipment.' Section 2 of the amendments, 2 enacted as part
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Opportunity Program, 3
provided tuition reimbursements to parents of nonpublic school students with an annual taxable income of less than $5,000. Sections 3
through 5 of the legislation 4 permitted parents not qualifying for tuition reimbursements under Section 2 to subtract from their adjusted
gross income for state income tax purposes a designated amount for
each dependent for whom at least $50 was paid in nonpublic school
6
tuition. 5 The Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty

1. Ch. 414, § 1, [1972] N.Y. Laws, amending N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 549-53
(McKinney Supp. 1974). Chapter 414 became effective May 22, 1972.
2. Ch. 414, § 2, [1972] N.Y. Laws, amending N.Y. EDuc. LAw §§ 559-63
(McKinney Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Ch. 414, § 2].
3. Sections 2-5 of Chapter 414 constituted a single program composed of two
parts: a tuition grant provision (§ 2) and tax exemption provisions (§§ 3-5).
4. Ch. 414, §§ 3-5, amending N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 612(c), (j) (McKinney Supp.
1972).
5. Section 5 of Chapter 414 provides deductions from adjusted gross income as
follows:
The amount allowable for
If New York adjusted
each dependent is:
gross income is:
Less than $9,000
9,000-10,999

$1,000
850

700
11,000-12,999
550
13,000-14,999
400
15,000-16,999
250
17,000-18,999
150
19,000-20,999
125
21,000-22,999
100
23,000-24,999
0
25,000 and over
See note 106 infra. "Because of the peculiar nature of the benefit allowed" by §§ 3-5,
the Supreme Court found it difficult to adopt any traditional tax label for the benefit:
It is, at least in its form, a tax deduction since it is an amount subtracted from
adjusted gross income, prior to computation of the tax due. Its effect, as the District Court concluded, is more like that of a tax credit since the deduction is not
related to the amount actually spent for tuition and is apparently designed to
yield a predetermined amount of tax "forgiveness" in exchange for performing
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challenged each form of aid as violative of the first amendment's es7
tablishment clause.
The federal district court, solely on the basis of the pleadings, held
that Sections 1 and 2 violated the establishment clause, but that Sections 3 through 5 were constitutional. 8 The Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's determination that Section 1 was unconstitutional. 9
The Court, however, concluded that the "primary effect" of the New
York amendments, "as written,"' 10 was to advance religion in violation
of the establishment clause. The Court, therefore, affirmed the district court holding that the tuition reimbursement under Section 2 was
unconstitutional, and reversed the lower court's determination upholding the tax exemption scheme of Sections 3 through 5. Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973)."

This note considers the Court's treatment of New York's tuition
a specific act which the state desires to encourage-the usual attribute of a tax
credit.
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
789 (1973). The Court saw no reason to select one label over the other since "the
constitutionality of this hybrid benefit does not turn in any event on the label we
accord it." Id. This note will refer to the tax provision as an "exemption," a more
general and less controversial term.
6. The committee was an unincorporated association. Several individuals who
were residents and taxpayers of New York, some of whom had children attending
public schools, were also plaintiffs.
7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. ."
8. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp.
655 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
9. The Supreme Court heard the case on direct appeal from a three-judge district
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). The possibility of direct aid to nonpublic
schools had been foreclosed earlier by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971). See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
10. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 798 (1973); see note 105 and accompanying text infra.
I1. The Court decided several related cases in the same term: Levitt v. Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (invalidating a New
York statute providing for reimbursement of private schools for certain costs of staterequired testing and upkeep); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (striking a
Pennsylvania statute providing tuition reimbursement to parents of nonpublic school
children); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding unconstitutional, as
aid to the continuation of racial segregation, a Mississippi statute which provided text
books to students in both public and private schools); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734
(1973) (upholding a South Carolina statute providing revenue bonds to private colleges for uses other than sectarian study or religious worship). See also Essex v. Wolman, 409 U.S. 808 (1973), motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied, 413
U.S. 923 (1973) (invalidating an Ohio tuition grant program which, in contrast to
the New York program considered in Nyquist, did not require income limitations for
applicants).
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reimbursement (Section 2) and tax exemption (Sections 3 through 5)
provisions. Since the tuition and tax provisions were expected to
equalize the educational choice afforded to all parents and children of
the state, regardless of financial capabilities, 12 it is submitted that the
Court's decision invalidating the provisions is an unwarranted application of the constitutional prohibition against an establishment of religion. To support this proposition, this note will trace the development
in the establishment clause cases of the tripartite test of constitutionality, examine the concept of benevolent neutrality as an underlying rationale to be applied in assessing the constitutionality of various forms of state aid, analyze the Court's application of the primary
effect test and, finally, discuss the alternatives which remain open to
state legislators who wish to equalize the burdens of educational costs
while preserving a choice among educational systems.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREE-PRONGED TEST
The Court has developed a three-pronged test of constitutionality
13
which it has applied in analyzing establishment clause questions:
State action must (1) serve an acceptable secular legislative purpose,
(2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion
4
and (3) produce no excessive church-state entanglements.'
The first step in development of this test occurred in Everson v.
Board of Education.'5 The New Jersey statute under review in Everson provided reimbursement to all parents for the bus transportation
costs of their school children. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held
12. Ch. 414, § 2.
13. Development of the test is traced in Essex v. Wolman, 342 F. Supp. 399, 40611 (S.D. Ohio 1972). For an alternative to the historical approach, see Konvitz, Separation of Church and State: The First Freedom, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 44

(1949). For a permissive interpretation of the first amendment and a criticism of the
Court's treatment of religious education, see Note, Constitutional Barriers to Public
Assistance for Parochial Schools, 17 CATHOLIC LAw. 189 (1971); Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1949); Kauper,
Everson v. Board of Education: A Product of the Judicial Will, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 307
(1973); Landynski, The ConstitutionalQuestions, in GOVERNMENT AID TO NONPUBLIC

SCHOOLS: YES OR No? 86 (G. Kelley ed. 1972).
14.

See Mott & Edelstein, Church, State and Education: The Supreme Court and

Its Critics, 2 J. LAw & EDUC. 535 (1973), discussing the critics' arguments over interpretations and application of the establishment clause, from the decision in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) through Nyquist. See note 28 infra. See also
Note, Aid to ParochialSchools: A Re-Examination, 14 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 128

(1972).
15. 330 U.S. 1(1947).
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that the first amendment does not prohibit a state from using taxraised funds to pay bus fares for parochial school children as part of a
16
general program from which all school children are to benefit, so
long as the state remains neutral in its attitude toward religion. 17 Analogizing to "state-paid policemen, detailed to protect children going
8
to and from church schools from the very real hazards of traffic,"'
the Court treated the statute as a form of public welfare legislation
which assisted "needy or all" school children.' 9 In reaching its decision, the Court articulated the first prong of the test, the requirement
that there be an acceptable secular purpose served by the statute. Although the Court did not uphold aid to religious education per se, 20 its
welfare analysis and recognition that an acceptable secular purpose
maintains the neutrality of the state opened the channel of aid to nonpublic school children. However, while Everson, the touchstone for the
Court's interpretation of the establishment clause, 2 1 opened the channel, it simultaneously constructed the gates by which it might later
stop the flow of such aid. Justice Black, writing for the Court in Ever22
son, stated:
16. Id. at 17.
17.
[The First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to
be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions,
than it is to favor them.
Id. at 18. See Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 419 U.S. 888 (1974), in which the Court
held, in a memorandum opinion, that state officials need not provide bus transportation
to children attending church-related schools. The Court in Everson recognized that a
balance must be maintained between the prohibition of the establishment clause and
rights guaranteed by the free exercise clause of the first amendment:
New Jersey cannot consistently with the 'establishment of religion' clause of the
First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution
which teaches the tenets and faith of any church. On the other hand, other language of the amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens
in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans . . . or the members of any other
faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public
welfare legislation.
330 U.S. at 16 (emphasis in original).
18. 330 U.S. at 17.
19. Id. at 16-18.
20. But see id. at 20 (Jackson, J., dissenting) and Justice Rutledge's reading of
Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments." set out in
the Appendix to the opinion. Id. at 63. See also Corwin, supra note 13, at 3.
21. The social and historical context of the Everson decision is explained in
R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 84 (1972).
22. 330 U.S. at 15-16. But see Corwin, supra note 13, at 10; Kauper, supra note
13, at 313; Landynski, supra note 13, at 87; R. MORGAN. supra note 21, at 185-86. all
criticizing Justice Black's interpretation.
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The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. . .. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion.
The Court began to close the gateway to state aid in Board of
Education v. Allen. 2 3 There the Court applied a test comprised of the
acceptable secular purpose criterion of Everson and the requirement
that the primary effect of the legislation neither advance nor inhibit
religion.2 4 The Allen Court reasoned that the purpose of a New York
law authorizing the loan of textbooks to nonpublic as well as to public
school children was to benefit all school children. 2 5 In holding that the
primary effect of the statute was to ensure that the state remained
"completely neutral with respect to religion, '2 6 the Court stressed that
ownership of the books furnished to the students remained "at least
23.

392 U.S. 236 (1968) (Black, Douglas & Fortas, JJ., dissenting in separate

opinions).
24. The Court added the primary effect prong to the acceptable secular public
purpose requirement in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), in
which the Court held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute providing for Bible reading in public schools. The Court's application and treatment of the primary effect criterion is discussed in Note, Education Vouchers: The Fruit of the Lemon Tree, 24
STAN. L. REv. 687, 696 (1972).
25. 392 U.S. at 243.
26. Id. at 241. The common denominator of all establishment clause cases is the
principle that government must be neutral in its attitude toward religion. See Nyquist,
413 U.S. at 760 n.4. For a discussion of the Schempp doctrine of neutrality, see
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development. Part IL
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513, 533 (1968). In Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952), the Court explicated its concept of neutrality:
We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any
one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and
the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their
spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that government show a callous indifference to religious groups.
That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do
believe.
The Zorach Court upheld the New York release time program which permitted public school students to attend religious instruction classes elsewhere during the regular
school day. "The decision represents a major shift in attitude by the Court from
hostility toward religion to one of accommodation and co-operation." Note, Constitutional Law--Aid to Parochial Schools, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 784, 793 (1972).
See also Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 761 n.5.
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technically" in the state and that the schools themselves received neither funds nor books.2 7 In addition, the Court acknowledged that
nonpublic schools were providing secular as well as religious training,
thus satisfying the secular purpose criterion. 28 Therefore, furnishing of
texts on secular subjects was held constitutional. 2 9
In Walz v. Tax Commission,30 the Court further narrowed the
channel by adding the third prong to the test of constitutionality: the
31
legislation must not excessively involve the government with religion.
In upholding property tax exemptions to religious organizations for
property used solely for religious worship, Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the Court, re-emphasized the need for the state's "benevolent neutrality" in its attitude toward religion. 32 The Court concluded
that the legislative purpose was neither to advance nor to inhibit religion, and the effect was neither sponsorship of nor hostility toward
religion. 33 The Court stressed the form of the legislation: by not de27. 392 U.S. at 243-44. Compare Marburger v. Public Funds for Public Schools
of N.J., 417 U.S. 961 (1974), in which the Supreme Court, by memorandum opinion,
affirmed a federal district court's invalidation of a statute providing reimbursement to
nonpublic school parents for their expenditures on secular textbooks, instructional
materials and supplies. The distinction between school and child as aid recipients was
first accepted by the Court in an earlier textbook case, Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). Commentators have labeled this the "child benefit"
concept. See Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State
Entanglement, 1971 Sup. Cr. REV. 147, 180; Mott & Edelstein, supra note 14, at 53955; Note, Constitutional Law-Aid to ParochialSchools, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 784,
788 (1972).
28. 392 U.S. at 247. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Quick
Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), were the basis for the Court's acknowledgment
that nonpublic schools provided secular education. The Pierce Court recognized the
educational function of a private school in holding that attendance at a private school
satisfied Oregon's requirement of attendance at public schools to further its policy of
compulsory education. For other implications of Pierce, see note 73 infra. In Quick
Bear the Court maintained the right of Indians to receive education at religious
schools at their own cost.
29.

[W]e cannot agree with appellants . . . that . . . processes of secular and

religious training are so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students
by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion.
392 U.S. at 248.
30. 397 U.S. 664 (1970); see Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 179 (1970); Kurland, Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961). See also Note, Constitutional Law-Aid to Parochial Schools, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 784, 798 (1972).
31. 397 U.S. at 674-75.
32.
[R] igidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is
to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none
inhibited. . . . [T] here is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference.
Id. at 669.
33. Id. at 672-73.
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manding a tax, the state was avoiding involvement with religious organizations. Taxing religious organizations would have resulted in
churches supporting the state, a condition the Court would view as
34
excessive entanglement.
In recent years, the Court has placed increased emphasis on the entanglement criterion. For example, in both Lemon v. Kurtzman35 and
Tilton v. Richardson,3 6 decided in the same term, the Court focused
on the question of excessive entanglement but reached different results
in each case. In Lemon, the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania statute
providing reimbursement to nonpublic primary and secondary schools
for teachers' salaries, texts and instructional materials used in teaching
secular subjects. The Court found that the "statutory restrictions designed to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and to ensure that state financial aid supports only
the former", required state surveillance that produced excessive entanglement.37 In distinguishing the aid provided by the Pennsylvania
statute which accrued directly to the nonpublic schools from the aid
endorsed in Everson and Allen, the Lemon Court apparently ignored
the "benevolent neutrality" rationale which supported the Court's application of the tripartite test in Walz. 38 As one commentator has suggested, the Court should be criticized for failing to explain why the
principle of neutrality, emphasized in prior opinions, should not permit state aid to parochial schools for secular functions. 39 Although
it preserved Everson and Allen, the Lemon Court limited their application to the forms of aid there provided.
In Tilton, the Court upheld against an entanglement challenge federal grants for construction purposes to church-related colleges and

34. Id. at 675. The Court found support for this reasoning in the fact that historical exemption of church property from taxation did not result in the establishment
of religion. Id. at 678.
35. 403 U.S. 602(1971).
36. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
37. 403 U.S. at 614. The Court emphasized that the state could not be certain
that teachers would not "inculcate religion" in teaching secular subjects without excessive involvement of the state in policing the process. Id. at 618, 620-21. For
comments on the neutrality of teachers in public schools, see Kelley, The Questions
of Public Policy, in GOVERNMENT AID TO NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS: YES OR No? 57 (G.
Kelley ed. 1972); Barr, Pluralismin American Education, id. at 36.
38. See text accompanying notes 15-29 supra. In Lemon, state financial aid directly
funded the nonpublic schools while the state aid in Everson and Allen went to students and/or their parents. 403 U.S. at 622.
39. Giannella, supranote 27, at 186.
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universities. 4 0 The Court found that direct funding of nonpublic
higher educational facilities through a one-time, single-purpose grant,
with "no continuing financial relationships or dependencies, no annual
audits, and no government analysis of an institution's expenditures on
secular as distinguished from religious activities," 4 ' did not create
excessive entanglement with religion. The religiously affiliated schools
could receive government funds so long as those funds did not serve
sectarian purposes. 42 Tilton diminished the harshness of the Lemon
decision: Although the Lemon Court did not temper its excessive entanglement analysis with the benevolent neutrality principle, in Tilton
the Court indicated that "benevolent neutrality" was still a viable consideration, demonstrating that all gates were not yet closed to state
aid for nonpublic school students.
It remained unclear after Lemon and Tilton how deeply the Court
would probe state legislation with each prong of the tripartite test.
Although the Court in Lemon and Tilton relied primarily on the excessive entanglement prong added to the test in WaIz, 43 it has since
upheld a district court which held that a challenged statute must satisfy each prong of the test of constitutionality, i.e., secular purpose,
44
neutral primary effect and no excessive entanglement.

40. Because the act made no reference to religious affiliation or nonaffiliation as a
requirement for receiving a grant, the Court read the act to include all colleges and
universities. 403 U.S. at 678.
41. Id. at 688. Since institutions of higher education had a greater degree of
academic freedom, the need for "intensive government surveillance" to prevent the
use of funds for sectarian purposes was not as great as in the case of primary or
secondary schools. Id. at 687-88. But see Justice White's separate opinion in Lemon,
403 U.S. at 669. The Lemon Court distinguished the probable annual appropriations
for teachers' salaries from the one-time grant in the funding of construction. Id. at
621-22.
42. The Court invalidated the section of the statute limiting the use of funds to
secular-purpose buildings for 20 years only; after the 20-year period, the buildings
might be used for sectarian purposes, and this would result in a primary effect of
establishing religion. 403 U.S. at 683. However, the Court refused to accept the argument that religious and secular educational functions of colleges and universities are
in fact inseparable. Id. at 680-81. The Court relied on the Allen distinction between
secular and religious functions. Id. In addition, the Court refused to invalidate an
act of Congress simply on the basis of the hypothetical profile of a "typical sectarian"
institution which the aid opponents presented to the Court. Id. at 682. In Nyquist,
however, the Court was apparently satisfied with hypothetical concepts of sectarian
educational institutions. See 413 U.S. at 767-68.
43. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
44. "[T] he aspects of this test are in the conjunctive and all must be satisfied if
the statute is to withstand constitutional scrutiny." Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399,
411 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd 409 U.S. 808 (1973).
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II.

NYQUIST: SCRUTINIZING THE PRIMARY EFFECT
OF THE NEW YORK AMENDMENTS
A synthesis of the holdings in the pre-Nyquist establishment clause

cases places the forms of aid contemplated by the New York amendments in perspective. The prior cases demonstrate that the Court will
tolerate certain forms of aid or certain government relations with religious groups: (1) public services to students and their parents or to
schools, e.g., police and fire services; 45 (2) one-time, direct grants to
colleges and universities for secular purposes only, e.g., construction
funds;4 6 (3) direct grants for special services available to all students
of the state, e.g., remedial reading programs; 47 (4) reimbursements to
48
parents for nonsectarian educational needs, e.g., bus transportation;
and (5) sanctioning the right to act in accordance with religious beliefs despite state law if the act is not harmful to society, e.g., noncompliance with compulsory education laws. 49 Conversely, other holdings

45. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 25 (1947).
46. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
47. Remedial reading programs were included in the special services enumerated
in Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio 1972), affd, 409 U.S. 808 (1973).
The Court did not question the "services and materials" part of the statute when it
invalidated the tuition grant part of the same statutory section. Presumably, the types
of "services and materials" listed could be provided to all public and nonpublic
schools. In Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974), the Court considered the claim
of parents of nonpublic school children to benefits of Title I of the federal Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, §§ 101 et seq., 20 U.S.C. §§ 241 et seq.
(1970), for educationally deprived children. The Court, however, did not decide
whether requiring state officials to make on-premises instruction available to nonpublic school children would contravene the establishment clause. No state plan had
yet been implemented to provide nonpublic school children with the same instruction
provided for public school children under the Act.
48. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
49. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Yoder Court held invalid
under the free exercise clause the conviction of respondents, members of Amish
sects, for violating the state's compulsory school attendance law. The Court relied on
the government neutrality principle of Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), that an exception to a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds does not "run afoul of the Establishment
Clause" where the exception protects the right of free exercise. 406 U.S. at 220-21.
The Court's reliance on the government neutrality principle in Yoder indicates it
has not abandoned that guideline, as Lemon might suggest. For a discussion of Yoder
and its impact on parental rights in education, see Moskowitz, Parental Rights and
State Education, 50 WASH. L. REV. 623 (1975). '
In Sherbert v. Verner, supra at 410, the Court held that a South Carolina unemployment compensation statute abridged a Seventh-Day Adventist's right to the
free exercise of religion by denying her unemployment compensation because she
would not, on the basis of religious conviction, accept work on Saturdays. For a discussion of a balancing of the two religion clauses, see R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME
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indicate that the Court will not tolerate: (1) direct state aid to nonpublic primary and secondary schools in the form of money payments
for secular (as well as sectarian) purposes, e.g., payment of teachers'
salaries; 50 and (2) use of public school facilities for sectarian educational purposes, e.g., religious instruction in public buildings. 51 In sum,
the Court has not denounced the concept of aid to nonpublic school
students, but has objected to certain vehicles of aid or the lack of re52
strictions on the aid.
The Nyquist Court noted that direct aid to sectarian schools, "in
whatever form," is invalid in the absence of an effective means to ensure that the funds will be used exclusively for "nonideological purposes."'53 In deciding that the tuition reimbursements and the tax
exemption, for similar reasons, had the primary effect of advancing
religion, 54 the Court refused to view as significant the fact that the

COURT AND RELIGION (1972). But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy conviction of a member of
the Mormon church upheld despite the religious duty of members to practice
polygamy). See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfield v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws and proscription of certain sales
on Sunday upheld).
50. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
51. Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). On the desirability of
maintaining a choice of educational systems as one reason for attacking religious
exercises in the public schools, see id. at 243 (Brennan, J., concurring). In McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the Court upheld an Illinois regulation
prohibiting religious education in public schools. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962), the Court held that recitation of the Regent's prayer in New York public
schools constituted a requirement of "religious activity" in contravention of the establishment clause. Compare Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va.
1974) (court distinguished incidents of an invocation and benediction at a public high
school graduation ceremony from the repetitive or pedagogical function associated
with school prayer cases and held the ceremony did not contravene either of the religion clauses) with Lemke v. Black, 376 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (proposed
use of church facilities for public school graduation held violative of the first amendment rights of certain graduates where no compelling secular need was evident).
52. For an establishment clause test that concentrates on the "direct" or "indirect" form of the aid and the distinction of educational functions rather than on the
application of the tripartite test, see Americans United for the Separation of Church
and State v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). There the court chose to
review the state aid affecting students in private colleges on two bases: (1) aid
directly to parents only incidently conferred a benefit on church schools, thus no
establishment resulted; and (2) aid distinguishing its use for secular, as opposed to
sectarian, purposes would not contravene the establishment clause. Because the aid
statute lacked restrictions to confine use of the funds to only secular purposes, it
failed under the court's second test. See also California Educ. Facilities Authority v.
Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 526 P.2d 513, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974).
53. 413 U.S. at 780.
54. Id. at 794.
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grants and the exemptions would go directly to parents. 5 5 The Court
stressed that under the state's program the "qualifying parent" would
receive "encouragement and reward for sending his [or her] children
to nonpublic schools," 56 and that the provisions did not guarantee that
the state aid would support only secular educational functions.5 7 For
these reasons, the Court was satisfied that the aid provisions had failed
the test of constitutionality. 58 A statistical allocation of funds between
secular and sectarian functions did not satisfy the Court that the aid
would assist only the secular function, 59 nor did characterization of the
aid as a reimbursement convince the Court that the aid was not an
60
"incentive" to parents to choose nonpublic schools.
The channel of aid left open by earlier decisions need not have
been closed to the tuition grant and tax exemption programs scrutinized in Nyquist. Rather, both provisions should have withstood the

tripartite test of constitutionality. The principle of neutrality advocated by the Court, coupled with the state's intent to assure all of its
citizens equal educational choice, seems to justify the provisions. While
the Court recognized that the provisions satisfied the secular purpose
criterion, 61 it misconceived or ignored the actual effect of the amend-

ments in concluding that they had an unconstitutional "primary
effect.162 Basing its decision on the primary effect of the provisions, the Court did not reach the excessive entanglement question. 6 3

55. Id. at 781,791.
56. Id. at 791; see note 87 infra.
57. 413 U.S. at 783, 794.
58. Id. at 785, 791. The Court's reasoning seems a bit conclusory perhaps because
the case was decided without presentation of evidence.
59. Id. at 787-88.
60. Id. at 786.
61. We do not question the propriety, and fully secular content, of New York's
interest in preserving a healthy and safe educational environment for all of its
school children. And we do not doubt-indeed, we fully recognize-the validity
of the State's interest in promoting pluralism and diversity among its public and
nonpublic schools. Nor do we hesitate to acknowledge the reality of its concern
for an already overburdened public school system that might suffer in the event
that a significant percentage of children presently attending nonpublic schools
should abandon those schools in favor of the public schools.
Id. at 773. For a discussion of the value of educational diversity and the secular function of religious schools, see Haskell, The Prospects for Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 56 MINN. L. REV. 159 (1971). See also M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 91-97 (1962); R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 190 (1972)
(public policy argument for aid to nonpublic schools).
62. It should be noted that the Court failed to define its "primary effect" concept.
63. 413 U.S. at 794; see notes 83-85 and 93-94 and accompanying text infra.
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Tuition Grants

The Court could have upheld the tuition grant program in Nyquist
under the primary effect analysis6 4 of earlier establishment clause
cases on either of two grounds. 65 First, forms of aid analogous to the
tuition grant adopted by New York have been held to have a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 66 In Board of Education v. Allen, 6 7 the Court upheld a New York law which provided
for the loan of textbooks to nonpublic and public school children. The
books were furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership was
retained by the state. "Thus no funds or books [were] furnished to
parochial schools, and the financial benefit [was] to parents and children, not to schools." 68 Similarly, the tuition reimbursements challenged in Nyquist were provided for the parents rather than for nonpublic schools. 6 9 Moreover, although the provision of such aid may
serve indirectly or incidentally to promote the religious function by
64. Regardless of which prong is stressed, Nyquist indicates that a degree of review approaching the strict scrutiny of equal protection review will be used where a
violation of the establishment clause is claimed. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963), the Court required a "compelling state interest" to justify the operation
of a South Carolina statute on a Seventh-Day Adventist as it deprived her of constitutional rights under the free exercise clause.
65. The Court did not discuss the equal protection implications of its decision, but
the equal protection of nonpublic school students and parents is a latent issue evidenced by the stated concerns of the New York Legislature, 413 U.S. at 764-65, and
in the classification of aid recipients in the statute. "Equal protection" should be a
valid argument where the basis of complaint or of justification is classification, religious or otherwise, and where economic status and the principles of the religion
clauses are so intertwined. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (Where the "fundamental political right" to vote was being hampered by imposition of a poll tax, the wealth classification so established was an "invidious discrimination" violative of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.) The
state of New York, in the instant case, did not create the wealth class as a means of
discriminating, but was trying to remedy existing inequities. See Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (maximum family welfare grant limitation did not discriminate
against recipients having large families to deny them equal protection; Court would
not "second-guess" state officials who allocated limited welfare funds); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (where appellate review was an integral part of the
Illinois trial system, indigent defendant denied equal protection of the laws and due
process when refused the opportunity to appeal conviction for lack of funds). See
also Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(197 1); note 74 and accompanying text infra. The Court did refer to the classification
of student recipients of state aid.
66. For the forms of aid which have survived scrutiny, see text accompanying
notes 46 & 48 supra.
67. 392 U.S. 236 (1968); see notes 23-29 supra.
68. Id. at 243-44 (footnotes omitted); see note 27 supra.
69. See text accompanying note 3 supra. That the aid in Allen went to the children and parents distinguishes that case from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), in which the statute permitted payment of funds directly to the schools. See
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releasing monies for religious purposes which might otherwise have
been used for secular functions of the nonpublic schools, this should
not have created the unconstitutional primary effect: "[A] n indirect
or incidental effect beneficial to religious institutions has never been
' 70
thought a sufficient defect to warrant the invalidation of a state law.
Second, the unique welfare character of the New York tuition
grants distinguished their practical effect from that of other types of
aid previously held unconstitutional by the Court. 7 1 The New York
statute made funds available only to low-income families7 2 which required assistance in order to enjoy the right of educational choice
supposedly available to all.7 3 It was an attempt to ensure that no parents "of the state would be denied, de facto, the choice of an educational system due to their economic status.7 4 Thus, the primary effect
of the tuition grant scheme was merely to advance the availability of
choice rather than encourage religion. The funds would have provided
notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra. Chief Justice Burger, concurring and
dissenting in part in Nyquist, concluded that the essence of the Court's prior decisions was "that government aid to individuals generally stands on an entirely different
footing from direct aid to religious institutions." 413 U.S. at 80 1.
70. 413 U.S. at 775. Chief Justice Burger makes a similar statement in his concurring opinion. Id. at 800.
71. The Court applied a "welfare" rationale in Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 (1947), discussed in text accompanying notes 15-22 supra, but the statute
did not set up a classification of recipients based on financial need as the New York
statute did in Nyquist.
72. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
73. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in which the Court declared the Oregon Compulsory Education Act, requiring public school attendance to
fulfill state educational requirement, unconstitutional as violative of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause. The Court recognized the right of parents to provide an equivalent education for their children in a privately operated school of the
parent's choice. See also Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610, 613
(1927). See generally Moskowitz, Parental Rights and State Education, 50 WASH. L.
REv. 623 (1975). The Colorado Supreme Court in Stanley held that "the right of
parents to have their children taught where, when, how, what, and by whom they
may judge best, are among the liberties guaranteed by section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." 255 P. at 613. In Griswold, the
Supreme Court also referred to "the right to educate a child in a school of the parents'
choice" as included within the first amendment. It is in this context of protected rights
and the economic handicaps that hamper the free exercise of those rights that the
equal protection argument arises. See note 65 supra.
74. Although the Court has recognized the right of parents to educate their children at the school of their choice, see note 73 supra, the practical question remains:
What recourse, other than remedial legislation such as that attempted by New York,
is available to low-income families to enable them to exercise their rights? Without
the economic means to make the choice among schools, there is no choice. See Fahy,
Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 73, 84-85

(1949): "The guaranty of religious freedom is well nigh worthless if the state is
obliged to manage its own temporal [including school] affairs in such a manner as to
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only about 15 percent7 5 of the actual cost of nonpublic education;
whereas, the compulsory education laws of the state required that
76
more than 15 percent of school time be devoted to secular courses.
The Court, however, as in Lemon, refused to accept statistical separa77
tion of secular and sectarian uses of funds.
Under the neutrality concept of Everson and Allen,78 the balancing
between advancement and inhibition79 should have indicated that the
New York grant system was "rewarding" neither parents nor schools.
Even if the New York statute had provided a 100 percent reimbursement to parents of nonpublic school children, those parents would
have realized no economic advantage over their public school counterparts. The Court, however, chose to distinguish the tuition grants
from the bus rides of Everson and the textbooks of Allen on this
ground: 80
See also Kelley, The Quesmake religious education or exercise impracticable .
tions of Public Policy, in GOVERNMENT AID TO NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS: YES OR No?
57, 58 (G. Kelley ed. 1972). It has been argued that:
[T] he combination of Pierce [v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)], which
permitted private schools to assume state educational duties, Walz [v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)], which permitted economic benefits to be directly
conferred on churches by way of tax exemptions, and Yoder [Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)], which held that a long-standing religious commitment to a particular kind of nonsecular education is protected by the freedom of
religion clause, could well be read to justify-if not to compel-legislative assistance to students at private schools.
Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's
Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 242-43 (1973). But see Luetkemeyer v.
Kaufmann, 95 S. Ct. 167 (1974); Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO.
L.J. 1115, 1140(1973).
75. The New York amendment placed a 50% limit on the amount of tuition
that the state would refund and the state estimated that only 30% of costs came
from nonpublic school tuition. Thus, the actual state subsidy would be about 15%.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 787.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 787-88; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
78. See note 17 and text accompanying notes 15-28 supra. Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting in part in Nyquist, concluded that the reimbursement and tax benefit plans
were consistent with the principal of neutrality. 413 U.S. at 812.
79. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
80. 413 U.S. at 782. The Court stated that Allen and Everson also differ from
Nyquist in a second important respect: "In both cases the class of beneficiaries included all school children, those in public as well as those in private schools." Id. at 782
n.38 (emphasis in original). In rebuttal, it should be noted that the public school
children in Nyquist already were drawing upon state educational funds purportedly
available to all and, therefore, did not need the benefits of the New York provision.
Where no tax funds are being expended for strictly religious purposes, and no more
tax funds are being used than would be if the pupils were in public schools, at least
one commentator has argued that payment of funds to parochial schools should be
immune from establishment clause protest. See Choper, The Establishment Clause
and Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 CAL. L. REV. 260, 265-66 (1963).
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[M] ost bus rides have no inherent religious significance . . . [and]
[a]bsent evidence, we cannot assume that school authorities . . .
are unable to distinguish between secular and religious books or that
they will not honestly discharge their duties under the law.

The Court's language suggests that tuition grants have an inherent religious significance or that the secular benefits obtained could not be
distinguished from the religious interests served.8 1 The tuition grant
provision simply endeavored to ensure equality among parents
whether they chose public schools or not. The alternative was to inhibit choice due to economic fact and the state's failure to remedy the
82
inequality.
As a final observation, no excessive entanglement of the state with
religion was threatened by the tuition grants:8 3 The state would have
provided grants to those citizens who had applied for reimbursement
after paying tuition to the schools of their choice.8 4 Parents, not
schools, would have received the grants. Thus, had the Court reached
this prong of the test, it would have confronted a fact pattern clearly
distinguishable from those in Lemon and Tilton8 5 where payments
were made directly to religiously affiliated institutions.

81.

But see Haskell, The Prospectsfor Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 MINN.

L. REV. 159, 177 (1971):

If the principle of primary social contribution of the church school is the furnishing of an education to its students substantially comparable to the education
which is afforded by the public school, then it appears that the "effect" standard
is satisfied regardless of any categorization of the funds.
82. See note 74 supra.
83. Because the Court invalidated the tuition grant scheme on a primary effect
rationale-the second prong of the tripartite test of constitutionality-it did not reach
the excessive entanglement question. 413 U.S. at 794; see note 63 and accompanying
text supra. Referring to the excessive entanglement test, one commentator states:
Paradoxically, as Justice White observed in his separate opinion [in Lemon], the
more the state does to counter the risk [of advancing sectarianism], the more
vulnerable the program is to the entanglements objection.
Kauper, Public Aid for ParochialSchools and Church Colleges: The Lemon, DiCenso,
and Tilton Cases, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 567, 586-87 (1971). Compare Note, Recent Developments Regarding the Establishment of Religion, 49 CHI-KENT L. REV. 100, 105
(1972) (referring to the "double-edged sword" .of restricted use of government funds
and excessive entanglement) with Note, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1068, 1072 (1973), indicating:
Lemon strongly implies that a state may reimburse parochial schools for expenditures on certain 'secular, neutral, or nonideological' services without the danger
of directly subsidizing religious activity and thus without the necessity of undertaking entangling supervision of parochial school performance of the services.
84. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 35-44 supra.
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Tax Exemption
The tax exemption of Sections 3, 4 and

586

of the New York

amendments raised the establishment issue because the only taxpayers
who would qualify for the exemption would be those who had chosen
to send their children to nonpublic schools. Consideration of the ex-

emption raised the additional question of what standard of scrutiny
the Court would use in reviewing a state's taxing power where the
complaint alleged establishment of religion.
In striking the tax exemption, the Court relied upon the same pri-

87
mary effect analysis it used in reviewing the tuition grant provision,

but was less persuasive in its reasoning. 88 Consistent with the reasoning
in Everson, Allen, Lemon, Tilton and Walz, 89 the Court could have

held the tax exemption constitutional because taxpayers, not the nonpublic schools, were afforded economic relief.90 Under the exemption

scheme, rather than bestowing grants in aid, the state would have
merely refrained from collecting money from certain individuals. 9'
Parents of nonpublic school students would have been excused from
86. See notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra. Compare the result invalidating
New York's tax exemption because benefits would go to parents choosing nonpublic
schools, with the effect the Court refused to condone in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958): Veterans who refused to take a loyalty oath could not be denied a property tax exemption. "To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms
of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech." Id. at 518.
88. In support of tax credits, it has been argued that: (1) the primary reason for
credits is to compensate taxpayers for expenses incurred for services that government
otherwise would have provided; and (2) denial of a general form of tax relief to
parents who incur parochial school expenses raises the problem of equal protectiona more formidable problem than the possibility that the benefit will ultimately support
a religious enterprise. Giannella, supra note 27, at 198.
89. See notes 38 & 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
90. See Danian, The Constitutionality of State Statutes Providing Income Tax
Credit for Parents of Parochial School Children, I N. Ky. ST. L.F. 56, 58 (1973):
[T]he effect of [Minnesota and Ohio tax credit] statutes is that educational
taxes paid by parents of parochial school children which previously were used
for secular education in public schools with the result of no benefit to such parents are now used for expenses of secular education in parochial schools so as
to benefit these parents.
91. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in part in Nyquist, argued that tax deductions,
even when directed to religious institutions occupy quite a different constitutional
status under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment than do outright grants to
such institutions." 413 U.S. at 806. In support of his argument, Justice Rehnquist
quoted the following from Walz v. Tax Comm'n:
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not
transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that
the church support the state. No one has ever suggested that tax exemption has
converted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into arms of the state or put em-
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paying an amount of their taxes otherwise due to balance their contribution to education against that of taxpayers who had chosen to utilize the public school system that all taxpayers supported. Nonpublic
school parents would have continued to pay twice for the exercise of
92
their choice, but the additional cost would have been diminished.
Moreover, the tax exemption provided little danger of excessive
entanglement between church and state. In Walz, 93 the Supreme
Court upheld a property tax exemption for churches; in Nyquist New
York had granted exempt status to parents of nonpublic school children. Having found no excessive entanglement in Walz, 9 4 the Court
should have found none in Nyquist: The state dealt solely with its own
taxpayers through the regular state tax returns. As was the case with
the tuition reimbursement, the tax deduction should have been upheld
on the ground that it secured the parents' right to choose the type of
95
education their children would receive.
Unlike the Court's review of other forms of aid,9 6 the challenge to
the tax provision implicitly questioned the state's taxing power. The
Court has traditionally deferred to this power when constitutional
challenges to its exercise have arisen.9 7 In Nyquist, the issues of aid to
ployees "on the public payroll." There is no genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishmentof religion.
Id., quoting 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (emphasis added). Rehnquist saw no rational
difference between the property tax exemption reviewed in Walz and the income tax
exemption of Nyquist. The majority distinguished Nyquist and Walz on the basis of
the historical approval of tax exemption for church property and the potential interference with free exercise which taxing church property would create. 413 U.S. at
792-93.
92. Based on the table of deductions in § 5 of the statute, see note 5 supra, the
estimated net benefit to a family with less than $9,000 adjusted gross income (AGI)
would have been $50 per child. As AGI increased, the estimated benefit per child
decreased. 413 U.S. at 766 n.19.
93. 397 U.S. 664(1970).
94. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
95. See note 73 supra.
96. Compare the types of aid and state action in notes 45-51 and accompanying
text supra.
97. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937), in
which the Court considered challenges to Alabama's Unemployment Compensation
Act which taxed only corporations having eight or more employees. The Court held:
It is inherent in the exercise of the power to tax that a state be free to select the
subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions. Neither due process nor equal protection imposes upon a state any rigid rule of equality of taxation.... A legislature is not bound to tax every member of a class or none. It may make distinctions
of degree having a rational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny they
must be presumed to rest on that basis if there is any conceivable state of facts
which would support it.
Id. at 509. More recently, the Court rejected strict scrutiny as the standard by which
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nonpublic school children and the prerogatives of the state in exercising the taxing power were joined for the first time. 98 Consequently,
the Court had two alternatives: It could have treated the tax exemption as it had other forms of aid to nonpublic school students or with
the deference traditionally afforded state tax provisions. The Court's
choice of the former, apparently without even considering the latter
approach, indicates that a "rational basis"9 9 for state taxing measures
is not sufficient where the Court recognizes an establishment clause
challenge. Yet, even under a standard of strict scrutiny, the exemption
should have been upheld: The State interest was "compelling" in that
it sought to protect the constitutional right of choice100 and was designed to benefit all New York taxpayers and school children.
III.

DIMINISHING LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES

The Court's decision in Nyquist should not relieve, but in fact
should increase, the concern of proponents of aid to parents of nonpublic school students. The degree of scrutiny to which the Court will
subject any particular statute under the tripartite test is not measur-

it should view the Texas school taxing system. In San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1973), the Court stated:
[Other cases requiring strict scrutiny] involved legislation which "deprived," "infringed," or "interfered" with the free exercise of some such fundamental personal
right or liberty. . . . But we think it plain that, in substance, the thrust of the
Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized
under judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's efforts and to the
rights reserved to the States under the Constitution.
See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973). The analysis
in San Antonio was under the fourteenth amendment rather than the first amendment
as in Nyquist; but the point of San Antonio is that, although the constitutional claim
of those threatened by the tax statute was a denial of equal protection, the Court still
afforded the statute the traditional presumption of constitutionality. It did this by refusing to recognize the alleged "wealth classification." Arguably, the Nyquist Court
might have refused to recognize the alleged "establishment," thus allowing use of a
"rational basis" test of the tax provision. Unfortunately for plaintiffs in San Antonio
and for defendants in Nyquist, the choice of the review standard required a threshold
determination of the nature of the claim which determined the decision on the merits.
98. Although it did not articulate the standard of review, the Walz Court suggested that a property tax provision could withstand attack under an establishment
clause challenge. 297 U.S. at 672-73.
99. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (i937).
100. The Court has treated the choice from among educational systems as one
protected by the first amendment. See note 73 supra. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 232 (1972), the Court characterized the interest of guiding "the religious future
and education" of children as a "fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with
that of the state [in compelling school attendance]."
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able. 10 1 In general, the Court apparently will undertake a strict scrutiny to ascertain if there is a compelling state interest justifying the
state aid to those who may, constructively, be in a religious classification. 10 2 In addition, by invalidating the New York tax exemption for
parents of nonpublic school children, the Court indicated that, despite
the implication of its previous decision, 0 3 the form of aid proposed
by the states matters little in determining its constitutionality. Under a
more favorable analysis, Nyquist has, at least, obscured the amount of
influence which the form of aid will have on the Court. The decision
is especially disheartening for aid proponents who advanced various
programs which appeared acceptable following the Court's decision in
04
Lemon.
The Nyquist Court did indicate that in some forms aid might con05
stitutionally find its way to children in nonpublic schools:'
Our examination of New York's aid provisions, in light of all relevant
considerations, compels the judgment that each, as written, has a "primary effect that advances religion . .. ."

101. 413 U.S. at 773 n.3 1. The principle which the Court should follow in its review of state aid provisions is still a matter of debate among commentators; many
variables are involved. For a discussion of the critics' views and a statement of the
relation between the "theory of the First Amendment clauses" and the "multiple priorities of today's complex society," see Mott & Edelstein, Church, State and Education:
The Supreme Court and Its Critics,2 J. LAW & EDUC. 535, 591 (1973).
102. See text accompanying notes 96-100 supra. "Strict scrutiny" in establishment clause cases, however, may not be as strict as that used in considering racial
classifications, for the Nyquist Court did not specifically compare would-be recipients of
state education aid to beneficiaries of aid in racial discrimination cases. See 19 WAYNE
L. REV. 1629 (1973), which discusses an Internal Revenue Service ruling denying tax
exemption or contribution deductions for racially segregated private schools. The determinative factor for the service ruling was racial discrimination and not religious
affiliation. The ruling was upheld in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.),
affd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (197 1).
103. See notes 45-51 and accompanying text supra.
104. See Giannella, supra note 27, at 198. Professor Landynski advanced four
forms of aid for consideration following Lemon: (1) tax credits; (2) voucher plans;
(3) operational maintenance costs; and (4) assigning public school teachers to teach
secular subjects in nonpublic schools. Landynski, The Constitutional Questions, in
GOVERNMENT AID TO NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS: YES OR No? 86, 93-94 (G. Kelley ed.
1972). Versions of the first three were invalidated in Nyquist. For discussions of various recent or current forms of aid, see M. SMITH & J. BRYSON, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS: THE LEGALITY OF USING PUBLIC FUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS (1972); Mitchell, Religion and Federal Aid to Education, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 113 (1949).
See also R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 113 (1972).

105. 413 U.S. at 798 (emphasis added). The phrase "as written" implies that other
language and a different structuring of aid provisions may still be acceptable to the
Court.
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Nevertheless, whether a statute can be drafted which will satisfy the
test is questionable. The Court has demonstrated that it will assess the
ultimate effects, 10 6 regardless of statutory wording and statements of
to ascertain if the recipients of aid are merely
legislative 1purpose,
"conduits" 0 7 for religious organizations.
The Court did, however, suggest that a tax deduction might be acceptable if it were in the nature of a regular deduction.' 0 8 Perhaps the
legislature could classify tuition payments, or portions of them, to nonprofit private schools as contributions to "charities," includable in a
"genuine" charitable deduction. A statute providing a benefit available
to all taxpayers, e.g., deductions for charitable contributions, including payments to support religious education, would more closely
resemble the tax exemption approved in Walz and the type suggested
by the Nyquist Court.
By probing the effects of legislation beyond the granting of direct
aid to nonpublic schools, the Nyquist opinion is potentially disastrous
to statutes written in terms of welfare legislation. 10 9 For example, a
statute may name all needy school children as recipients of state
funds; however, in a state with a conventional, "free" public school
system, only nonpublic school students from low-income families
would actually require and use the aid. 1 10 By excluding references to
"public" and "nonpublic" schools and by referring only to "all students," the state's classification of aid recipients by economic need
would be acceptable on its face although the effect of the statute's
classification of recipients would be unconstitutional under the
Nyquist primary-effect reasoning.
106.

See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra. See also Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783

n.39.
107. 413 U.S. at 786.
108. Id. at 790 n.49.
109. Immediately following Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), welfare
legislation was considered the approved vehicle of aid. In meeting the primary effect
criterion, emphasis would shift from the recipient to the form of the aid: " [T] he easiest
type of program to sustain is that which can be labelled as 'public welfare legislation.'
... [G] eneral assistance should not be denied to citizens simply because of their religious faith." Note, Aid to Parochial Schools: Income Tax Credits, 56 MINN. L. REV.
189, 198 (1971).
110. This is the situation in Washington. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.58.700-.707
(1974). The provisions include financial aid to parents of "needy students," without
specifying whether the students must attend "nonpublic" or "public" schools, so long
as the schools attended are state accredited. The financial aid awarded is applicable to
the cost of "supplies, books, tuition, incidental and other fees." Public school children
of the state do not pay tuition in their own school districts.
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The most viable mechanism to ensure to families of all economic
levels a choice between educational systems is legislation providing
benefits to all school children in a system in which both "public" and
"nonpublic" school children require aid."' Ideally, the state might
close all public schools and initiate an educational system completely
dependent on vouchers: Each student would choose a school to attend
and would request reimbursement from the state for the tuition paid
to the chosen school. 1 2 Legislation placing all children in the same
class, and requiring all parents to support the same overall system
through taxes, would not have the primary effect of advancing religion; rather, it would have the effect of ensuring educational choice to
all students. 1 13 Under such a plan, there would be but one legislative
class, all school children, and within that class all would receive the
same benefits. The state would continue to prescribe minimal educational standards and to certify teachers. Parents would pay taxes to
support the voucher system rather than certain public school districts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court in Nyquist indicates that it will use a degree of review
approaching strict scrutiny when an establishment of religion claim is
raised. This intimation and the lengths to which the Court went to
find an unconstitutional primary effect portend further difficulties for
state legislatures in their efforts to equitably provide a choice of educational programs for their constituents. Any legislation which attempts
to equalize the economic and social burdens of taxpayers who desire
to exercise their constitutional right of educational choice must have
the primary effect of treating all parents and students alike. All students and their parents must have access to any monetary aid or tax

11. Such a classification meets the requirements of the Court's concept of the class
of "all school children." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n. 38.
112. For a model voucher plan and some conclusions supported by research on
the subject, see CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, EDUCATION VOUCHERS; A
REPORT ON FINANCING ELEMENTARY EDUCATION BY GRANTS TO PARENTS (1970) (prepared for the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity). State requirements for racial integration and/or proscription of racial segregation as a condition to a school's participation in a voucher system should alleviate the fear that such a system would facilitate
racial segregation in the various schools, an effect condemned in Griffin v. Prince Edward
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). Reimbursements could be denied to parents who
subsidize racially segregated schools.
113. An educational voucher plan, according toKelley, The Questions of Public
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benefit made available, and all students and their parents must reasonably be expected to directly benefit in fact from the aid provided. An
educational system completely dependent on vouchers appears the
ideal means of meeting these requirements and also assuring that families of all economic levels are able to choose among educational alternatives for their children.
E. Michele Moquin

Policy, in GOVERNMENT AID TO NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS: YES OR No? 57, 66 (G. Kelley
ed. 1972), would be:
a far-reaching effort to break the public monopoly over education, encourage new
educational systems and thereby, for reasons of expected efficiency, introduce in
education the same competition that has made American business so successful.
See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 15; Note, Education Vouchers: The Fruit of the
Lemon Tree, 24 STAN. L. REV. 687 (1972).
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